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Abstract 
  
Recent evidence suggests that individuals with ASD may not accumulate distinct 
representations of emotional information throughout development. On the basis 
of this observation we predicted that such individuals would not be any less likely 
to falsely remember emotionally significant as compared to neutral words when 
such illusory memories are induced by asking participants to study lists of words 
that are orthographically associated to these words. Our findings showed that 
typical participants are far less likely to experience illusory memories of 
emotionally charged as compared to neutral words. Individuals with ASD, on the 
other hand, did not exhibit this emotional modulation of false memories. We 
discuss this finding in relation to the role of emotional processing atypicalities in 
ASD. 
 
Key Words: Autism Spectrum Disorder, Memory, Orthographic associations, 
Emotional processing, Illusory memories. 
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Illusory memories of emotionally charged words in Autism Spectrum 
Disorder: Further evidence for atypical emotion processing outside the 
social domain 
 
Research over the past four decades has firmly established that individuals from 
across the autism spectrum are severely compromised in various aspects of 
affectively patterned communication (e.g., Corona, Dissanayake, Arbelle, 
Wellington & Sigman, 1998; Hobson, Ouston & Lee, 1988, Joseph & Tager-
Flusberg, 1997; Kasari, Sigman, Mundy & Yirmiya, 1990; Loveland, 2003; Moore, 
Hobson & Lee, 1997; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & Yirmiya, 1993). Although these 
atypicalities are widely accepted to constitute a diagnostically sensitive 
manifestation of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Lord, Rutter, Goode, 
Heemsbergen, Jordan, Mawhood & Schopler, 1989; Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 
1994; Magyar & Pandolfi, 2007; Robins, Fein, Barton & Green, 2001), their 
causes remain the matter of debate. Some authors maintain that the emotional 
disturbances associated with ASD are the result of abnormalities in the 
development of socio-cognitive capacities such as face processing or ‘Theory of 
Mind’ understanding (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Ring, Bullmore 
Wheelwright, Ashwin & Williams, 2000; Frith, 2003; Leslie & Frith, 1990; Schultz, 
2005). Others, by contrast, suggest that abnormal affective development lies at 
the root of the interpersonal abnormalities characterising the condition (e.g., 
Hobson, 2002; Loveland, 2005, Mundy & Sigman, 1989). The major difficulty in 
resolving this debate rests with the fact that most of the relevant evidence for it to 
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date, stems from studies assessing how individuals with ASD understand and 
react to the emotional signals of others. As such, the evidence can be 
accommodated by both theoretical accounts. In order to advance our 
understanding of the role of affective disturbances in ASD, it is therefore 
important to broaden the focus of research and assess how the emotional 
significance of stimuli impacts on processes that are not primarily of a social 
nature. Studies of memory are ideally suited for this purpose because the 
influence of emotional factors in this domain are well established and understood 
(see Reisberg & Hertel, 2004 and  Uttl, Ohta & Siegenthaler, 2006 for a collection 
of extensive reviews). 
  
One of the most reliable findings in the typical memory literature is that 
emotionally significant information is better remembered than neutral information 
(Bradley, Greenwald, Petry & Lang, 1992; Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Heuer & 
Reisberg, 1990; Kensinger & Corkin; 2003). To date only four studies have 
investigated this phenomenon in individuals with ASD. The first, was conducted 
by Beversdorf and colleagues (Beversdof, Anderson, Manning, Anderson, 
Dordgren, Felopulos, Nadeau, Heilman & Bauman, 1998) who presented a group 
of 10 ASD and 13 typically developed adults with an audiotape of 10 emotionally 
salient statements (e.g., Carl shot his gun at someone) and 10 emotionally 
neutral statements (e.g., Mike is talking on the phone). After each block of 
statements participants were asked to write down as many of them as possible. 
Results indicated that only typically developed adults, and not those with a 
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diagnosis of ASD, recalled significantly more of the emotionally salient 
statements. In direct contrast to this finding, South and colleagues (South, 
Ozonoff, Suchy, Kesner, McMahon & Lainhart, 2008) reported no differences in 
memory for emotional material between a group of 36 adults with a diagnosis of 
ASD and 38 typically developed adults. In their experiment, participants were 
asked to study a random sequence of emotionally salient and neutral words for a 
subsequent recognition memory test. This time both groups of participants were 
found to exhibit superior memory for the emotionally salient material. Whilst the 
findings from these two studies are clearly at odds, a study from our own 
laboratory (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008) may help to resolve this inconsistency. Similar 
to South et al. (2008) we also presented participants with a random sequence of 
emotionally charged and neutral words and also found no group differences in 
memory for the emotional material between ASD and typically developed adults 
on an immediate test of memory. When assessing participants’ memory again 
after 1 hour and once more after 1 day, however, the memory advantage for 
emotional words increased for typical participants whilst it diminished for those 
with a diagnosis of ASD. Importantly, we had included a set of semantically 
related but neutral words (i.e. names of fruit) in our materials, allowing us to 
determine to what extent the memory superiority for emotional words may be 
accounted for in terms of the semantic similarity between them. In this respect 
our results showed that neither group of participants exhibited enhanced memory 
for emotionally charged over semantically related neutral words on the immediate 
free recall test. This emotion-specific enhancement of memory only emerged on 
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the 1 hour and 1 day delay tests, and it only emerged for typical but not ASD 
participants. Together, this pattern of findings suggests that individuals with ASD 
may exhibit a quantitative enhancement in memory for emotionally charged as 
compared to neutral information over short periods of time because of semantic 
aspects of the stimuli rather than their emotional quality per se. In the Beversdorf 
et al. (1998) study the blocked presentation and use of statements rather than 
single words may not have rendered semantic aspects of the emotional material 
salient enough to facilitate such a ‘semantic modulation’ of memory in ASD, 
whereas in the South et al. (2008) study such semantic influences on memory 
may explain why these authors failed to observe differences between ASD and 
typical participants. The evidence from the verbal domain, therefore, suggests 
that the emotional quality of verbal information does not impact on memory in 
ASD in the same qualitatively distinct fashion as in typical individuals and this 
conclusion has recently received additional support from the non-verbal domain. 
More specifically, Deruelle, Hubert, Santos and Wicker (2008) found that, unlike 
typical individuals who exhibit a memory advantage for negative as compared to 
positive and neutral pictures, participants with ASD demonstrated no such 
memory advantage (if anything they tended to remember neutral images more 
than positive and negative ones).    
 
Considering the available evidence, one might expect that memories of emotional 
material in individuals with ASD are qualitatively no different (or only minimally 
so) from their memories of non-emotional information. Over a lifetime, this would 
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mean that individuals with ASD would accumulate representations of emotional 
information that are qualitatively indistinct from representations of non-emotional 
information. One way to test this contention is through a memory illusion 
paradigm developed by Pesta, Murphy and Sanders (2001). In their experiment,  
participants were presented with a list of words comprising blocks of 
orthographically associated words (e.g., Book, Nook, Cook, Look,…Cape, Tape, 
Shape, Nape,…) that participants were instructed to try to remember for a 
subsequent recognition memory test. Unbeknownst to the participants, this 
recognition test included a number of words that were orthographically very 
similar to the words that had been on the studied list, but which participants had 
not actually seen. Half of these so-called Target Lures were neutral (e.g., Hook) 
and half of them were emotionally charged (e.g., ‘Rape’). Pesta et al. (2001) 
found that typical individuals were extremely unlikely to falsely identify the 
emotionally charged Target Lures as having been on the original study list whilst 
their false recognition rates of neutral Target Lures was far above chance. In 
other words, whilst the orthographic similarity between the studied words and the 
Target Lures gave rise to illusory memories of certain neutral words, the 
distinctive nature of the emotional words attenuated such illusory memories. 
 
In the current experiment we replicated one of Pesta et al’s. (2001) experiments 
in order to test the hypothesis that individuals with ASD would be as likely to 
succumb to illusory memories of emotionally charged as neutral words. In 
addition, we were interested in whether individuals with ASD would generally be 
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as susceptible to the illusory memory phenomenon as typically developed 
individuals. To date, most studies investigating this phenomenon in ASD 
(Beversdorf, Smith, Crucian, Anderson, Keillor, Barrett, Hughes, Felopulos, 
Bauman, Nadeau & Heilman, 2000; Bowler, Gardiner, Grice & Saavalainen, 
2000; Hillier, Campbell, Keillor, Phillips & Beversdorf, 2007) have employed a 
paradigm developed by Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995), in 
which participants study groups of semantically rather than orthographically 
associated words (e.g., bed, dream, pillow,…) before memory is tested for some 
of these words together with semantically associated Target Lures (e.g., sleep). 
Overall the evidence suggests that individuals with ASD are susceptible to such 
semantically induced memory illusions, even if they may sometimes be less 
susceptible to them than typical comparison individuals (Beversdorf et al., 2000). 
Interestingly, Hillier et al. (2007) found that individuals with ASD were less 
susceptible to illusory memories of abstract visual patterns that were induced by 
asking participants to study sets of similar visual patterns despite the fact that 
groups did not differ on a standard semantic memory illusion paradigm. This 
pattern of results is informative in relation to the ‘Weak Central Coherence’ 
(WCC) (e.g. Shah & Frith, 1993) and ‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ (EPF) 
accounts of ASD (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert & 
Burack, 2006). The former suggests that individuals with ASD are impaired in 
processing globally constituted and conceptual meaning, which seems at odds 
with the finding that individuals with ASD are subject to semantically induced 
memory illusions. The EPF account, on the other hand, predicts superior 
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perceptual processing in ASD and this account seems to be in line with the 
patterning of findings in the memory illusion literature. To date, no study has 
assessed memory illusions in ASD in the verbal domain that are induced by 
structural (i.e. orthography) rather than semantic associations between words. 
Given the evidence so far, one might expect individuals with ASD to be less 
susceptible to such illusions. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty two individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (18 male, 4 female) and 22 
typically developed individuals (17 male, 5 female) participated in the current 
experiment. Individuals with ASD were diagnosed by experienced clinicians and 
a review of available records and/or assessment with the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, et al., 1989) confirmed that all met DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
ADOS scores were only used as an exclusion criteria when participants provided 
a statement of their diagnosis that did not include information about their 
developmental history. The 10 individuals included in this study who were unable 
to provide such details all met relevant cut-offs for an ASD on the ADOS 
assessment. Two individuals whose ADOS scores fell below the cut-off for an 
ASD were included in the present study because their medical records clearly 
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suggested that such a diagnosis was appropriate (exclusion of these participants 
did not alter the results presented below significantly). Typical participants were 
recruited from the local community through newspaper advertisements, and brief 
interviews ensured that none of the participants in either group suffered any 
psychiatric or neurological disorder (other than ASD) or were taking any 
psychotropic medication. Typical and ASD participants were individually matched 
to within 7 points of verbal IQ (WAIS-IIIUK; The Psychological Corporation, 2000) 
and, as Table 1 indicates, groups did not differ significantly in terms of 
performance IQ (t = 1.41, df = 42, ns) full-scale IQ (t = 1.29, df = 42, ns) or age (t 
= 0.53, df = 42, ns). The experimental procedures outlined below adhere to the 
ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological Society and were approved 
by the University’s Senate Ethical Committee.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
Materials & Design 
 
The experimental materials used in the current study were taken directly from 
Pesta et al’s. (2001) second experiment and included 12 groups of 10 
orthographically related words, 12 Target Lures, and 3 so-called ‘distinctiveness 
attenuators’. Of the 12 orthographic word groups, six were designated as Set A 
and six as Set B. Within each of these sets, three groups of words included the 
orthographic neighbours of three neutral Target Lures (Hook, Shave and Peach 
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for Set A and Rink, Park and Digit for Set B), whilst the other three groups 
included the orthographic neighbours of three emotionally charged Target Lures 
(Rape, Bitch and Whore for Set A and Slut, Hell and Penis for Set B). As outlined 
by Pesta et al. (2001), the emotional and neutral Target Lures were matched on 
word frequency (Kučera & Francis, 1967) and letter length, whilst the lists 
comprising the orthographic neighbours of each type of Target Lure were 
matched as closely as possible in terms of the number of strict orthographic 
neighbours of their respective Target Lure. The three ‘distinctiveness attenuators’ 
(Fuck, Piss & Asshole) were presented during the study phase of the experiment 
and served to satisfy the participants’ expectations of seeing emotionally charged 
words during the experiment (for ethical reasons participants were fully informed 
about the nature of the experimental materials).   
  
During the study phase of the experiment, participants were presented with a 
sequence of 67 words, including the sixty words from the orthographic word 
groups of either Set A or Set B, the three ‘distinctiveness attenuators’, and four 
buffer words (2 at the beginning and 2 at the end of the list). The buffer words 
were included to counter primacy and recency effects. Words were presented 
visually on a lap-top monitor at a rate of one word every 3 seconds. Each word 
appeared in bold, Times New Roman font (size 60) in the centre of the screen, 
remained there for 2 seconds and was followed by a 1 second blank screen 
before the onset of the next word. Following Pesta and colleagues, the order of 
presentation followed a pseudorandom blocked design, whereby sets of 5 words 
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from a given orthographic word group were presented in sequence, whilst the 
order of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants. The order of 
words within each block was randomised. The three ‘distinctiveness attenuators’ 
were inserted in serial positions 13, 34 and 50. During the recognition test 
participants were presented with a random selection of 18 words that they had 
studied (3 from each orthographic word group), 18 words from the set that they 
had not studied (3 from each orthographic word group) and all 12 Target Lures. 
The order of presentation was random and the format of presentation was similar 
to that during the study phase with the exception that the words remained on the 
screen until the participants had made their response.  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated laboratory. Prior to the 
experiment, participants were briefed about the nature of the experiment. They 
were told that they would be required to try to remember a list of words for a 
subsequent memory test and that some of the words in the experiment would be 
‘sexually charged, vulgar or offensive’. The illusory memory phenomenon was 
not mentioned at this stage. Once participants had given their consent to take 
part in the experiment, they were presented with the to-be-remembered list of 
words. Immediately after the last word, participants were given instructions about 
the impending recognition memory test. The instructions specified that 
participants would again see a list of words and that this list would include some 
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of the words that they had just seen and some new words. Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether or not they had seen a particular word before and 
the experimenter noted these responses on an answer sheet. After the end of the 
recognition test procedure, participants were fully debriefed about the nature of 
the experiment and paid according to standard University fees. 
 
Results 
 
Prior to analysing the illusory recognition rates of Target Lures, we assessed 
participants’ true and false recognition rates of the orthographic word group 
items. Following Pesta and colleagues (2001), we computed participants’ ‘Yes’ 
responses to these items as a function of whether these were part of the studied 
or unstudied set and according to whether they comprised the orthographic 
neighbours of the emotional or neutral Target Lures. A 2 (Group) x 2 (Studied vs. 
Unstudied) x 2 (Orthographic neighbour of emotional vs. neutral Target Lure) 
mixed ANOVA of these data, which are set out in Table 2, revealed a main effect 
of Studied/Unstudied (F(1,42) = 328.84, p < .001; effect size r = 0.94) but no 
other main effects or interactions (F < 2.20; effect size r < 0.22). The main effect 
of Studied/Unstudied simply confirms that true recognition rates exceeded false 
recognition rates. The important result, however, is that both groups performed 
similarly well in terms of their overall recognition rates and across words 
comprising the orthographic neighbours of the emotional and neutral Target 
Lures. Thus, any differences in illusory Target Lure recognition between groups 
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or across emotional and neutral Target Lures are unlikely to be due to differences 
in terms of how well participants remembered the orthographic neighbours of 
these Target Lures. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Table 2 also presents the illusory Target Lure recognition rates. A 2 (Group) x 2 
(Orthographic neighbour of Studied vs. Unstudied list items) by 2 (Emotional vs. 
Neutral) mixed ANOVA of these data revealed main effects for the 
Studied/Unstudied (F(1,42) = 50.75, p < .001; effect size r = 0.74) and 
Emotional/Neutral (F(1,42) = 4.78, p < .05; effect size r = 0.32) factors, 
confirming that Target Lures are more likely to be misremembered when they are 
orthographically similar rather than dissimilar to the studied words, and that 
emotionally charged Target Lures are less likely to be misremembered than 
neutral Target Lures. A closer inspection of Table 2, also indicates the expected 
lack of an emotional modulation of illusory memories in the ASD group and 
planned within-group comparisons confirmed this impression. For the typical 
group, main effects were observed for both, the Studied/Unstudied (F(1,21) = 
23.08; p < .001; effect size r = 0.72) and Emotional/Neutral (F(1,21) = 9.27; p < 
.01; effect size r = 0.55) factors, whilst for the ASD group only the main effect of 
Studied/Unstudied was significant (F(1,21) = 27.97; p < .001; effect size r = 0.75) 
whilst the Emotional/Neutral factor had virtually no effect in this group (F(1,21) = 
0.49; ns; effect size r = 0.15).  
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Discussion 
 
The principal motivation for the current experiment was the observation that ASD 
individuals seem to retain emotionally significant information in a qualitatively 
rather indistinct fashion over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). On the basis of this 
observation, we suggested that individuals with ASD would be unlikely to have 
accumulated distinct representations of emotionally salient information 
throughout their lives, leading us to predict that they should not exhibit an 
emotional modulation of the illusory memory phenomenon. Before we discuss 
our results in relation to this hypothesis, we will briefly address the more general 
question of whether individuals with ASD are as susceptible to orthographically 
induced memory illusions as typically developed individuals. 
 
As outlined in the introduction, previous studies of memory illusions in ASD seem 
to suggest that such individuals may be less susceptible than typical individuals 
to illusory memories that are induced through perceptually anchored associations 
between to-be-remembered words whilst their susceptibility to conceptually 
induced memory illusions is more in line with that of typical individuals 
(Beversdorf et al., 2000; Bowler et al., 2000, Hillier et al., 2007). On the basis of 
the EPF model (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006) this pattern may be 
explained in terms of the superior perceptual processing abilities of individuals 
with ASD, which may enhance their ability to discriminate amongst very similar 
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patterns of perceptual information. In a way, one might consider the present 
findings to pose a challenge to such an interpretation because we observed no 
differences between ASD and typical participants in terms of their susceptibility to 
orthographically induced memory illusions. We hasten to add, however, that 
orthographic associations between words are not perceptually anchored in the 
same way as the similarities between the abstract visual patterns used in the 
Hillier et al. (2007) study. In this context, it would be of interest to devise an 
experiment in which memory illusions of verbal stimuli are induced through 
similarities amongst words in terms of font style or font colour, which would more 
closely resemble the associations of the abstract visual patterns used by Hillier et 
al. (2007). It is clear that further studies will be needed in order to clarify what 
kinds of associations amongst stimuli determine the degree to which individuals 
with ASD are susceptible to illusory memories. All we can conclude for the 
moment is that studies of this phenomenon may be fruitful in informing theoretical 
frameworks such as the ‘Weak Central Coherence’ (e.g., Shah & Frith, 1993) and 
‘Enhanced Perceptual Functioning’ accounts (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, 
et al., 2006), which attempt to specify the perceptual and conceptual processing 
abilities of individuals with ASD. 
 
In relation to our principal hypothesis, our findings support our prediction that 
individuals with ASD would be as likely to experience illusory memories of 
emotionally charged as neutral words. More specifically, whilst our findings from 
typical participants replicated the observations of Pesta et al. (2001), that the 
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experience of illusory memories is attenuated for emotionally charged as 
compared to neutral words, we observed no such attenuation for participants with 
ASD1. In the context of our recent observation that individuals with ASD do not 
retain emotionally significant words in a qualitatively distinct fashion over time 
(Gaigg & Bowler, 2008), we interpret the current findings as follows. Throughout 
development, individuals with ASD accumulate representations of emotionally 
significant information that are rather indistinct from their representations of 
neutral information. More specifically, we argue that autonomic responses during 
emotionally charged situations in ASD are atypically integrated with the 
subjectively experienced perception of the situation, resulting in an alteration in 
how relevant information is consolidated into long-term memory. In support of this 
view, the atypical pattern of memory for emotional material in ASD tends to be 
associated with abnormalities in how stimulus induced arousal influences the 
subjective perception of stimuli. In our previous memory study (Gaigg & Bowler, 
2008), for instance, we found that the subjective ratings of emotionality of words 
in ASD did not correlate with participant’s autonomic responses to the words, 
whereas for typical participants this correlation was significant. Several other 
studies have reported similar findings in relation to picture stimuli rather than 
words (Ben Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett, Goldberg, McLeod & Hoehn-Saric, 
2003; Hillier, Carpenter, Smith, Berntson, & Beversdorf, 2006) and as the recent 
                                                 
1
 One may criticise our conclusions in this respect on the basis that we observed no Group x Emotion 
interaction in our analyses. It is important to note, however, that even if this interaction were significant, it 
would be irrelevant in relation to our predictions, since the main effect of Emotion may nevertheless be 
significant within each group (i.e. the effect could simply be larger in the Typical group), which would 
suggest that both groups represented emotional words to some extent as qualitatively distinct. Our planned 
within-group analyses, therefore, are the most appropriate statistical analyses in relation to our predictions. 
 18 
study by Deruelle et al. (2008) suggests, individuals with ASD remember 
emotionally significant pictures no better than emotionally neutral ones (unlike 
typical participants).  
 
Of course, there are other ways to interpret our observations. On the basis of the 
EPF framework (e.g., Mottron et al., 2006) for instance, one could argue that the 
enhanced perceptual abilities of individuals with ASD interfered with the 
processing of the emotional quality of words, thus rendering them relatively 
indistinct and equally susceptible to the illusory memory phenomenon as neutral 
words. Such an explanation, however, would have to presume that the emotional 
quality of a stimulus is processed at a higher-order conceptual level than 
whatever perceptual process interfered with it. We do not think that such an 
assumption is tenable since the emotional quality of a stimulus tends to be 
processed relatively rapidly and automatically at a pre-conceptual level (LeDoux, 
1996). Even if it were the case, however, that an atypically well functioning 
perceptual system interfered with the processing of the emotional quality of 
information, it would not contradict our interpretation of the current findings. On 
the contrary, such interference effects might explain why autonomic emotional 
responses are abnormally integrated with the perceptual and cognitive processes 
in ASD that mediate the accumulation of truly emotional representations of 
environmental stimuli.  
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Another way of interpreting the current observations would be to suggest that 
individuals with ASD did not exhibit an emotional modulation of illusory memories 
because of more general abnormalities in language development. In fact, since 
language is acquired in the broader context of social cognition, one might argue 
that the current findings are the result of atypical reciprocal social development, 
an argument that could lead back to the theoretical debate that motivated the 
present experiment in the first place. In this context, however, it is important to 
consider the present findings not in isolation but in relation to other findings in the 
field. First, invoking atypical language development as an explanation for the 
present findings would not specify why individuals with ASD should remember 
emotionally significant words better than neutral ones over short periods of time 
(Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; South et al., 2008) whilst at the same time not retaining 
such words in a qualitatively distinct manner over time (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). 
Second, it is unclear how language development could compromise memory for 
emotional pictures (Deurelle et al., 2008) and how it could alter the extent to 
which subjective ratings of such pictures are related to arousal responses elicited 
by them (e.g. Ben Shalom, et al., 2003; Hillier et al., 2006). Third, a language 
account would be stretched to explain the finding that individuals with ASD 
acquire classically conditioned fear responses atypically when stimulus 
contingencies are unpredictable (Gaigg & Bowler, 2007) but not when they are 
predictable (Bernier, Dawson, Panagiotides & Webb, 2005) and such an account 
would also not clarify why decision making behaviours in ASD should be 
atypically related to the level of arousal participants exhibit in response to their 
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decision making choices (Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Queller, & Stout, 2006). 
Because of this line of evidence, we feel that an explanation of the emotional 
processing difficulties in ASD in terms of a purely social phenomenon seems no 
longer tenable. In our opinion this facet of the ASD phenotype is more 
appropriately explained with reference to emotional processes that operate 
outside as well as within the social domain and in this respect we argue that a 
core atypicality in ASD lies in how physiological aspects of emotional 
experiences influence perception and cognition. 
 
Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects our current interpretation, the 
observation itself remains the same and suggests that individuals with ASD do 
not only process socially relevant emotional signals atypically but that they are 
also relatively insensitive to the emotional significance stimuli that are not directly 
social in nature. As such, our findings contribute to a growing literature, which 
favours the view that emotional disturbances constitute a relatively central feature 
of the ASD phenotype (e.g., Hobson, 2002).  
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Table 1 
Summary of Age and IQ characteristics of the ASD and Typical Group 
 
 
ASD (N = 22) 
 
Typical (N = 22) 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Age 
(years) 33.5 12.3  35.2 9.6 
VIQa 101.1 12.6  103.1 11.5 
PIQb 96.7 13.3  102.5 14.1 
FIQc 98.7 12.6  103.7 13.1 
 
a
 Verbal IQ (WAIS-RUK or  WAIS-IIIUK) 
   
b
 Performance IQ (WAIS-RUK or  WAIS-IIIUK) 
   c
 Full-Scale IQ (WAIS-RUK or  WAIS-IIIUK) 
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Table 2 
Proportion of ‘Yes’ responses to Studied and Unstudied words and the Target 
Lures related to them as a function of emotionality and group (values in 
parenthesis reflect the SD).  
 
 
ASD (N = 22) 
 
Typical (N = 22) 
Word Type Studied Unstudied  Studied Unstudied 
Orthographic word group      
    Related to neutral Target Lure .63 (.27) .09 (.14)  .66 (.19) .06 (.08) 
    Related to emotional Target Lure .59 (.28) .04 (.08)  .69 (.26) .03 (.05) 
Target Lures      
    Neutral .39 (.32) .11 (.19)  .30 (.31) .12 (.19) 
    Emotional .32 (.36) .09 (.18)  .18 (.20) .00 (.00) 
Note: In relation to the Target Lures, the column labels 'Studied' and 'Unstudied' 
refer to the distinction between Target Lures that were either orthographically 
related to the Studied or Unstudied word groups. 
 
    
